Seminarios de Negocios 2011
El propósito del seminario es convertirse en el lugar donde presentar nuevas investigaciones así como también ser un foro para aumentar el conocimiento mutuo entre los miembros del profesorado. Planeamos 1 hora de exposición, seguido por 30 minutos de preguntas y de una discusión más informal.
Lugar: Lounge / Sala de Conferencias, Campus Ditella.
Horario: De 13h a 14:30h.
Jueves 17 de Marzo - Lounge. Gustavo Vulcano (UTDT, Operaciones).
Title: Revenue Sharing in Airline Alliances
Speaker: Gustavo Vulcano (UTDT, NYU)
Joint with: Xing Hu and René Caldentey, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, NYU
Airline alliances as means of collaboration among independent carriers are a growing trend in the industry. From a revenue management perspective, one of the most significant features of the alliances are codeshare itineraries by which independent airlines can collaboratively market and operate flights. Different from traditional, monopolistic airline revenue management, alliance members control a decentralized network of resources through independent reservation and information systems.
To study the revenue management problem of such decentralized network environment, we propose a two-stage hierarchical approach. In the first stage, airlines agree on how to share the revenues generated by these interline products. In the second stage, airlines operate independent inventory control systems in order to maximize their own expected revenues. Through both analytical and numerical studies, we find that the choice of the revenue sharing rule has a great impact on the performance of the alliance. In particular, in the static setting where each airline uses partitioned booking limits, there exists a revenue sharing rule under which the decentralized system can do as well as the centralized system. We further construct an asymptotic regime in which airlines" capacities and demands grow proportionally large, and prove that under our proposed revenue sharing rule, the performance of the alliance under dynamic inventory control converges to the performance under static booking limit control. The numerical comparisons between several dynamic heuristic policies and the static booking limit control confirm the quality of the approximation.
Nevertheless, given that the revenue sharing rule that is provably optimal in our model requires to disclose private demand information, we propose a simple revenue sharing rule that is based on public fares. This simple heuristic performs noticeably well in our numerical experiments, becoming an interesting candidate to be pursued in practice.
Jueves 31 de Marzo - Lounge. José Martinez (Oxford, Finanzas).
Investor Inattention: A Hidden Cost of Choice in Pension Plans?
Magnus Dahlquist and Jose Vicente Martinez
We investigate inattention on the part of pension plan participants using a novel dataset covering savings in Sweden"s Premium Pension System, data that permit direct comparison of the investment behaviors of pension and retail mutual fund investors. Unlike retail mutual fund investors, pension investors do not seem to react to past fund performance. This behavior means that pension investors face a greater risk of being caught in poorly performing funds. Our evidence suggests that inattention to past returns translates into poorer investment results for pension investors. We discuss a potential change in the design of the Premium Pension System that may mitigate costs for inattentive investors while maintaining flexibility for attentive investors
Jueves 26 de Mayo - Lounge . Juán José Cruces (UTDT, Finanzas).
Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts
Juan Cruces, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
Christoph Trebesch, Free University Berlin Hertie School of Governance
A main puzzle in the sovereign debt literature is that defaults have only minor effects on subsequent borrowing costs and access to credit. This paper questions this stylized fact by refining the proxy for country credit history used in the received literature. We construct the first complete set of investor loss (“haircut”) estimates in all debt restructurings between governments and foreign banks and bondholders since 1970, covering 178 cases in 68 countries. We then show that restructurings involving higher haircuts (lower recovery rates) are associated with significantly higher subsequent spreads (borrowing cost) and longer periods of capital market exclusion. The results give new support to reputational theories of sovereign borrowing and indicate punishment effects within credit markets.
Jueves 23 de Junio - Lounge. Mauricio Mittelman (UTDT, Marketing)- "Variety for the Sake of Variety".
Jueves 21 de Julio - Lounge. Javier Garcia Sanchez y Virginia Sarria (IAE, Finanzas).
Jueves 4 de Agosto - Sala de Conferencias. Nicolás Merener (UTDT, Finanzas).
Miercoles 17 de Agosto, 17 Hrs - Sala de Conferencias. Ugo Panizza (UNCTAD, Finanzas).
This paper examines whether there is a threshold above which financial development no longer has a positive effect on economic growth. We develop a simple model in which the expectation of a bailout may lead to a financial sector which is too large with respect to the social optimum. We then use different empirical approaches to show that there can indeed be “too much” finance. In particular, our results suggest that finance starts having a negative effect on output growth when credit to the private sector reaches 110 percent of GDP. We conclude by showing that the size of the financial sector was a significant amplifying factor in the global crisis that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
Jueves 25 de Agosto - Lounge. Maxim Mironov (IE, Finanzas).
Jueves 8 de Septiembre - Lounge. Juan José Cruces (UTDT, Finanzas).
Jueves 22 de Septiembre - Lounge. Guillermo Duran (UBA, Investigación Operativa).
"Aplicaciones de Investigación Operativa a problemas del mundo real"
Se presenta en esta charla la resolución de problemas reales mediante técnicas modernas de Investigación Operativa.
Los mismos incluyen problemas de logística, transporte, licitaciones, programación de fixtures deportivos, planificación de la producción, planificación en censos, educación, entre otros. Estos trabajos fueron realizados por grupos de la disciplina de la Universidad de Chile y de la Universidad de Buenos Aires. La idea es presentar los problemas y algunas de sus técnicas de resolución en un lenguaje comprensible para no especialistas del área.
Jueves 20 de Octubre-Study Group (Primer piso, edificio Alcorta. Jaqueline Pels (UTDT, Marketing).
The Service Dominant Logic: The Elusive Strategy for the Underserved in the Emerging Economies
Purpose – Business models (as discussed by mainstream business literature) have been developed having in mind the needs of customers in developed countries. Current business ‘solutions’, to the needs of the lower tiers of Latin-America, normally follow a less-for-less rationale, e.g. B-brands or economic packaging (Prahalad, 2005). Within the marketing literature a new approach, the Service Dominant Logic (S-D logic), has been introduced (Vargo and Lusch 2004, 2006.2008). This view suggests a radical change with regards to current business practices (G-D logic). It is the intent of this paper to try to verify if the S-D logic can provide the rationale that can help guide businesses in Latin-America.
Design/methodology/approach – This paper will see if three successful Argentine case studies are aligned with the core premises of the S-D logic.
Findings – All case show a high alignment with the S-D Logic fundamental premises
Research Implications – The cases provide an invitation for further research supporting the initial overlapping highlighted in this paper.
Practical implications – The article reveal that in order to achieve solutions on addressing the socially excluded, from both an economic and/or a social perspective, regardless of the profit/nonprofit nature of the initiative, managers need to focus on: the process, the role of co-creation, the exchange of knowledge and skills and on understanding the network of resource integrators.
Originality/value – The research proposes the S-D Logic as an approach that might provide managers with the much needed rationale to address the underserved in Latin-American countries.
Key words (max 5) – Service Dominant Logic – Latin-America – Inclusive Businesses – Bottom of the Pyramid
Lunes 24 de Octubre- Lounge. José Correa (U de Chile, Ingeniería Industrial).
Title: ON THE EQUILIBRIUM OF PREANNOUNCED PRICING POLICIES WITH STRATEGIC CONSUMERS
Abstract. Determining an optimal pricing policy when selling to strategic consumers is a growing research area. Previous research has investigated the expected performance of different pricing and allocation schemes. Most of the implied results rely on the notion of an equilibrium between the seller and the buyers, and within the buyers themselves.
Despite the growing attention of this research area, most of the studies do not analyze the equilibrium properties of such solutions. In this talk, we analyze the equilibrium properties when designing a pricing policy for a good with ﬁnite inventory and strategic consumers.
We show existence of equilibrium and uniqueness when only one unit is on sale. If however multiple units are to be sold, we show that a multiple equilibria may arise, and therefore the seller’s capability of optimizing its pricing policy is rather limited. Finally we discuss the underlying price optimization problem.
This is joint work with Ricardo Montoya and Charles Thraves.
Jueves 3 de Noviembre - Sala de Conferencias, Campus Ditella. Nicolás Stier (UTDT, Operaciones).
Title: Algorithmic Game Theory: Network Games and Their Applications
Operations Research techniques have traditionally been applied to problems that involve an organization or agent centrally optimizing a system. In the last decades, though, it has become increasingly important to incorporate competition to the set of tools available to us to model reality accurately.
This arose from the recognition that many of the applications central to Operations Researchers, such as transportation networks, telecommunication networks and the Internet, supply chain management, and revenue management, do not involve just one agent but instead involve many agents that have their own conflicting objectives. The most important tool used to address decision-making in the presence of competition in loosely integrated systems is Game Theory and the associated equilibrium concepts. Although part of this research makes use of the same methodology and models as those used extensively and traditionally by Economists, a differentiating factor has been a focus on computation and on quantifying the impact of competition with respect to a centralized system. This focus led to the name 'Algorithmic Game Theory'.
Transportation engineers have been looking at equilibrium concepts since Wardrop postulated in the 1950s that drivers select paths that are shortest under the prevailing traffic conditions. At around the same time, Vickrey proposed to use a pricing mechanism to make commuters internalize the congestion they generate, making self-interested decisions optimal for the system. In the 1990s, several researchers started to analyze the impact of competition in computer networks. This was driven by the recognition that the Internet ceased to be a research network controlled by a few cooperating universities, and became a platform where various for-profit companies compete to make money. Another area that experienced a need to incorporate competition is supply chain management. Although early models dealt with the internal operations of a company in isolation, it has been recognized that the reactions of competitors were an important ingredient of the decision.
This led to capacity, inventory and facility location problems that consider competition explicitly. Finally, in the last decade the field of revenue management, typically exemplified by the capacity and pricing strategies in use by airlines, also recognized that customers tend to be strategic and hence started to draw ideas from Game Theory.
Once it is recognized that agents make decisions based on competitive behavior, it is not straightforward to have a system operate optimally because agents consider their own utility functions, and disregard social welfare. In this talk, I will present an overview of the use of Game Theory in Operations Research, focusing on some of the examples described above. The main takeaway is that when there is competition, optimizing a system can be a complex task because the system's manager needs to consider the incentives of agents. Indeed, it can sometimes happen that an increase in capacity may backfire and degrade the performance for the system's users. A situation like this cannot possibly arise with centralized optimization because having more options always leads to better solutions. To understand the impact of misaligned incentives, I will present some results that bound the maximum inefficiency that can arise due to competitive behavior in network games.
Jueves 17 de Noviembre - Lounge. Rafael Di Tella (Harvard Business School)
Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs about Others’ Altruism
In this paper we present the results from a “corruption game” (a dictator game modified so that, the recipient has the possibility of taking a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to have the possibility of taking a larger proportion of the recipient’s tokens, took more of them. They were also more likely to report believing that the recipient had accepted the side payment (reducing the size of the pie). They also selected larger numbers as their best guess of the likely proportion of recipients acting “unfairly”. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others.
Martes 22 de Noviembre - Lounge. Tatiana Gorjup
Calidad laboral: Concepto multidimensional, práctica necesaria, responsabilidad de todos
Reconociendo la importancia que tiene el trabajo para las personas, durante los últimos años y principalmente a partir de los 90’ la preocupación por calidad laboral ha sido un tema recurrente no sólo en el contexto académico, sino también entre los agentes implicados en el mundo laboral.
Aspectos como la creación de nuevos puestos de trabajo, la disminución de la productividad en la economía, el aumento de la desigualdad en la distribución del ingreso, la desregulación del mercado laboral en muchos países y la presencia de formas de empleo contingente y temporal (Castells, 1995), han generado la percepción de que la calidad de los puestos de trabajo se está deteriorando. A su vez, un aspecto adicional que forma parte de esta tendencia es el amplio crecimiento y desarrollo del sector servicios, que se observa tanto en la trasferencia de trabajos desde el sector manufacturero hacia los servicios como en la creación de nuevos puestos de trabajo en este sector (Employment and European Social Fund, 2001; OECD, 2001).
Estas circunstancias han dado lugar al surgimiento de un debate sobre el impacto de estos cambios en la calidad de los trabajos y sobre las características de los trabajos que emergen en la economía de la información.
En este contexto, los objetivos de la disertación son: en primer lugar, exponer un modelo conceptual multinivel en el que se integran las diversas perspectivas y niveles que inciden en la determinación de la calidad laboral. En otras palabras, a partir de las dimensiones que conforman el concepto de calidad laboral (objetivas y subjetivas), en el modelo se integran los diversos agentes cuyas acciones determinan estas dimensiones (empresas, sindicatos y organismos gubernamentales), haciendo que la calidad laboral aumente o disminuya. En segundo lugar, presentar una aplicación del análisis de la calidad laboral a un sector caracterizado por su reciente surgimiento y cuya expansión derivó en la creación de una gran cantidad de puestos de trabajo en diferentes países: los call centers.
Jueves 1 de Diciembre - Lounge. Guido Sandleris (UTDT, Finanzas)
The Political Economy of Sovereign Defaults
In times of crises, sovereign debt repayment typically depends on the implementation of fiscal programs. In order to implement these programs, governments usually need to garner some political support. If they are unable to do it, a sovereign default usually follows. The literature on sovereign defaults has not paid attention to the presence of political constraints, assuming, instead, that governments have always unlimited access to the resources of the economy to repay their debts. In this paper, we analyze how the presence of political constraints affects sovereign governments' borrowing and default decisions. We do so in a standard DSGE model with endogenous default risk where we introduce two novel features: heterogeneous agents in the domestic private sector and a requirement that the government obtains some of their support to implement a fiscal program needed to repay the debt. In this framework, we show that there can be different types of sovereign default events. Default can arise because the government is unwilling to repay, in the best tradition of the sovereign debt literature, but also due to insufficient political support even if a benevolent government would prefer to repay. We calibrate the model to the Argentine economy and show that once political constraints are taken into account the matching with the data of standard sovereign debt models is weaker than previously understood.
Jueves 15 de Diciembre - Lounge. Sergio Schmukler (World Bank)
Gross Capital Flows: Dynamics and Crises
Fernando Broner , Tatiana Didier , Aitor Erce, Sergio L. Schmukler
This paper analyzes the joint behavior of international capital flows by foreign and domestic agents —gross capital flows— over the business cycle and during financial crises. We show that gross capital flows are very large and volatile, especially relative to net capital flows. When foreigners invest in a country, domestic agents tend to invest abroad, and vice versa. Gross capital flows are also pro-cyclical, with foreigners investing more in the country and domestic agents investing more abroad during expansions. During crises, especially during severe ones, there is retrenchment, that is, a reduction in both capital inflows by foreigners and capital outflows by domestic agents. This evidence sheds light on the nature of shocks driving capital flows and helps discriminate among existing theories. Our findings seem consistent with shocks that affect foreign and domestic agents asymmetrically, such as sovereign risk and asymmetric information.