Seminarios de Negocios 2019

El propósito del seminario es convertirse en el lugar donde presentar nuevas investigaciones así como también ser un foro para aumentar el conocimiento mutuo entre los miembros del profesorado. Planeamos 1 hora de exposición, seguido por 30 minutos de preguntas y de una discusión más informal.

                  Tel.: (+54 9 11) 5169 7301


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Jueves 28 de febrero | Sala principal, 3er piso
Franco Esteban Cattaneo

Competencia downstream y comercialización exclusiva

Abstract
I empirically investigate the role of downstream competition in the use of exclusive dealing and quantify its effects in the formation of the car retailing networks. I estimate a model where exclusivity impacts both supply and demand, and dealers choose which brand to offer in a strategic manner. These choices frame product and brand availability in the market and the retail networks for manufacturers. In my model, dealers have incentives to add more brands in order to sell a wider set of products, but their interest to differentiate from local rivals limits this option. Moreover, manufacturers could raise costs anticompetitively to deter dealers from selling products of rival brands. I analyze the potential for this foreclosing channel by estimating fixed cost differences between exclusive and non-exclusive stores using moment inequalities. I find that multi-dealing has an average cost advantage between 10,000 and 620,000 euros. These numbers indicate that downstream competition, instead of anticompetitive motives, explains a more substantial part of the prevalence of exclusive dealing in the market.

Franco Esteban Cattaneo
Ph. D. candidate in Economics, University of Mannheim.


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Viernes 8 de marzo | Sala principal, 3er piso
Andrés Gago

Costos de Confrontación en Negociaciones

Abstract
In negotiations the objectives of parties are generally in conflict. Facing this conflict can trigger negative emotions: A sentiment of nervousness, embarrassment or awkwardness. In this paper, by means of a lab experiment, I explore the existence and implications of these confrontation costs. First, I show that a significant proportion of participants avoid bargaining even when it delivers higher payoffs. I find that the avoidance rate is 50% higher in face-to-face negotiations relative to electronic negotiations. This offsets a higher rate of agreements conditional on bargaining, making the unconditional probability of agreement equal across communication channels. Second, after shutting down alternative channels, I attribute the decrease in bargaining propensity to an increase in confrontation costs. Both things together make e-negotiations welfare improving in my design, casting doubts on the general belief that face-to-face communication increases efficiency by fostering transactions. Finally, consistent with previous literature, I observe that women haggle less than men, and I find that confrontation costs are a reason to explain it.

Andrés Gago
Ph.D. Candidate in Economics, CEMFI.