Dos nuevas publicaciones de Paula Clerici

El Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales se complace en anunciar que la profesora Paula Clerici ha publicado recientemente dos artículos: el artículo Committee collaboration, competing principals, and partisanship in Argentina en The Journal of Legislative Studies, y junto a Adrián Albala y Alejandro Olivares el artículo Determinants of the cabinet size in presidential systems en el journal Governance.

Abstract del artículo "Committee collaboration, competing principals, and partisanship in Argentina": When will legislators assigned to the same committee cooperate with each other? In federal presidential regimes, both the President and governors demand policy answers from members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. Legislators’ preferences sometimes coincide with those of the President and the governors of their home states; on other occasions, they only align with the preferences of the President or the state governor; and, finally, at times preferences align with neither. In this paper, I analyse the committee system of a multi-party and multi-level legislature and test the partisan and territorial determinants of committee collaboration. My theory elucidates the inner workings of committee systems with competing principals and multiple parties to explain why we observe more active collaboration among supporters of the President and less active collaboration among those only aligned with the governor or with the opposition. I exemplify with the Argentine House of Representatives (1993–2017).

Para acceder a más información del artículo, hacer click aquí.

Abtract del artículo "Determinants of the cabinet size in presidential systems": The composition of cabinets under presidential regimes has constituted one of the top topics of the litterature in political science in recent years. However, nothing has been said about the proper size of those cabinets. That is, why some cabinets are 37 ministers large when other is formed by just 13 members? We carry on a theory of cabinet size under presidential regimes, using insights from both parliamentarist and presidentialist literature. Our model is composed of five hypotheses relying on an original dataset of 161 observations across 19 presidential countries of the Americas. Our main finding is that the inclusion of independents and/or technocrats impacts significantly on lowering caninets' size.
Para acceder a más información del artículo, hacer click aquí.