Novedades
02/07/2019
Nueva publicación del profesor Sebastián Etchemendy
El profesor del Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales, Sebastián Etchemendy, ha realizado una nueva publicación titulada The Rise of Segmented Neo-Corporatism in South America: Wage Coordination in Argentina and Uruguay (2005-2015) en la revista Comparative Political Studies (CPS)
Abstract: Argentina and Uruguay are the only democracies in Latin America (among few in the world) that have developed sustained, state-oriented national and sectoral wage bargaining between employers and unions after 2005. The article defines “segmented neo-corporatism” as a new form of centralized incomes policy in the region that applies to a substantial portion (i.e., registered workers), though not to all the labor force. Drawing on neo-corporatist theory, I explain, first, why only Argentina and Uruguay could consolidate a centralized, national wage policy in the context of the Latin American Left-Turn. Second, I test empirically the degree of state-oriented wage coordination. The study argues that monetary policy deterrence and higher levels of bargaining centralization largely explain the greater capacity of Uruguayan neo-corporatism to govern wage-setting compared with its Argentine counterpart. Finally, the article puts segmented neo-corporatism in comparative perspective in the developing world and draws some theoretical implications.
Para descargar el artículo, haga click aquí.
Abstract: Argentina and Uruguay are the only democracies in Latin America (among few in the world) that have developed sustained, state-oriented national and sectoral wage bargaining between employers and unions after 2005. The article defines “segmented neo-corporatism” as a new form of centralized incomes policy in the region that applies to a substantial portion (i.e., registered workers), though not to all the labor force. Drawing on neo-corporatist theory, I explain, first, why only Argentina and Uruguay could consolidate a centralized, national wage policy in the context of the Latin American Left-Turn. Second, I test empirically the degree of state-oriented wage coordination. The study argues that monetary policy deterrence and higher levels of bargaining centralization largely explain the greater capacity of Uruguayan neo-corporatism to govern wage-setting compared with its Argentine counterpart. Finally, the article puts segmented neo-corporatism in comparative perspective in the developing world and draws some theoretical implications.
Para descargar el artículo, haga click aquí.