El Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales tiene el agrado de invitar al seminario “The Incumbency Curse”, a cargo de Rocío Titiunik.

Abstract: We study the incumbency advantage in executive offices in multiple countries, documenting a systematic disadvantage in  developing democracies. We explain these results by focusing on the interaction between individual politicians and their parties in a context of high instability and reduced mechanisms for accountability. We argue that the absence of reelection creates incentives for politicians to provide less effort or engage in opportunistic behavior, and these incentives are more pronounced for politicians who belong to a party that is institutionally weak. The low performance of a reelection ineligible incumbent will therefore have electoral repercussions for the retiring incumbent's political party, resulting in incumbency disadvantages that fuel a cycle of instability. We test this argument with evidence from various countries in Latin America, including Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Ecuador, using term limits reforms and regression discontinuity designs as empirical strategies.

Expositora:
• Rocío Titiunik (Princeton University)

Moderador:
• Carlos Gervasoni (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella)