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Datos Personales:

Fecha de Nacimiento: 11/12/1976
Lugar de Nacimiento: Río Gallegos, Santa Cruz, Argentina.
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Educación:

- 2007 Ph.D. en Economía, University of Maryland at College Park.
- 1999: Maestría en Economía, Universidad de San Andrés.
- 1998: Licenciatura en Economía, Universidad de Buenos Aires.

Experiencia Laboral:

- 2007- 2010: Economista Asociado, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
- 2002-2007: Asistente de Investigación y Docencia, Departamento de Economía, University of Maryland at College Park.
- 1999-2001: Instructor , Universidad de Buenos Aires. Curso: Microeconomía.
- 1999-2002: Asistente de Investigación y Docencia, Universidad de San Andres. Areas: Sistema Bancario, Macroeconomía.
- 1998: Investigador, Instituto de Altos Estudios, Argentina.
- 1996-1997: Asistente de Investigacion, FIEL, Argentina.

Areas de Investigación y Docencia:

- Areas de investigación:
  Microeconomía: Mercados Eléctricos, Teoría de juegos, Diseño de Mecanismos.
  Finanzas: Valuación de Activos Empírica, Microestructura de Mercados, Sistema Bancario.

- Areas de docencia: Microeconomía, Teoría de Juegos, Dinero y Bancos, Macroeconomía.

Trabajos de investigación:

- *"Asymmetric supply function equilibrium with applications to investment in electricity markets"(2007)*
  Revise and Resubmit – Berkeley Electronic Journal of Theoretical Economics
Abstract: A fundamental characteristic of electricity markets is the use of different technologies. We present a model of supply function equilibrium (SFE) in which firms have different levels of installed capacity in each technology. The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of the asymmetric SFE model is established. A simple algorithm to calculate numerically the equilibrium is proposed. We also develop a model of investment decisions that uses the asymmetric SFE as an input. This model is used to study the equilibrium outcomes under different regulatory regimes.

- *"Competitive Procurement in the Presence of Learning by Doing" (2009 –con Wedad Elmaghraby y Se-Kyong Oh)*
  Revise and.Resubmit - Manufacturing and Services Operations Management
Abstract: When suppliers are able to gather tacit knowledge via learning by doing, and thereby reduce their costs, a buyer is faced with the following problem: Should the buyer auction off a longer-term contract in the hopes of capturing some of the cost savings incurred by the incumbent supplier via an eroding price contract, or should she procure via short-term contracts in order to leverage competition in each period. In this paper, we study the equilibrium behavior, optimal design, and performance of these two commonly used mechanisms for competitive procurement in a dynamic setting. Via analytical and numerical comparisons, we find that even in the presence of learning by doing, a buyer is better off running sequential auctions and procuring via short term contracts with a reserve price, rather than limiting competition and contracting with

a single supplier in the hopes of extracting a better future price. In order to understand our results, we then characterize the optimal mechanism and use it to explain the relative strengths and weaknesses of eroding price contracts and sequential auctions.

- *"Repeated Procurement and Long Term Contracts"(2007 – con Wedad Elmaghraby).*
Abstract: We consider a game in which a buyer mist repeatedly procure aninput from a set of firms. In our model, the buyer is able to sign long term contracts that establish the likelihood with which the nest perdio contract is awarded to an entrant or the incumbent. We find that the buyer finds it optimal to favor the incumbent, this generates more intense competition between suppliers. In a two period model we are ablo to completely characterize the optimal mechanism.

- *"The strategic effect of option contracts"(2007)*
Abstract: Wholesale electricity markets exhibit characteristics that can result in severe strategic supply reduction. Option contracts and other electricity derivatives have been suggested as a solution to this problem. In this paper the option contract market is modeled explicitly. This is relevant for imperfectly competitive industries since there are nontrivial interactions between spot and derivatives markets. The analysis focuses on how regulatory design and load serving entities conduct determine the ability of option contracts to induce competition in wholesale electricity markets.

Trabajos en Progreso:

- *"The (Formal) Return of Openess: A quantitative contribution to the history of economic thought" (2010) – en progreso.*

- *"Short Selling and Price Prediction" (2010 –con Cecilia Caglio) – en progreso.*

- *"Hidden orders in an Electronic Stock Exchange " (2009 –con Stewart Mayhew) – en progreso.*

Presentaciones:

- Conferencias: Lacea 2006, International Association for Energy Economics 2006, United States Association for Energy Economics 2006, AAEP 2001.

- Seminarios: Duke University, University of Wisconsin Madison, University of Maryland, Calgary University, Universidad de Alicante, IESE, Yahoo Research, US SEC, Universidad de San Andres, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Universidad del CEMA, Universidad Católica Argentina.

Publicaciones:

- "Measuring the level of competition in the Argentine banking industry" *Annals of the Argentine Association of Political Economy*, 2001. co-autor: Marcelo Dabós.

Referato:
- Journal of the European Economic Association, Energy Journal, International Journal of Industrial Organization.

Otros conocimientos:
- Idiomas: Inglés(fluido), Portugués (básico).
- Programación: Matlab, SAS, R.